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Until 1975, children with disabilities were frequently confined to
inferior educational placements or provided no education at all. The
passage of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), a
major civil rights bill, provided these children heightened protection. At
the heart of the IDEA is a school district's responsibility to provide each
child with an individualized education, often referred to as a "free
appropriate public education" ("FAPE"). l Congress explicitly requires
school districts to provide special education and related services designed
to meet unique needs and prepare children with disabilities for further
education, employment, and independent living." Where a public school
district is itself unable to provide a FAPE, IDEA requires the district to pay
for the student's enrollment in a private school.2 This provision has been
highly controversial because although such placements are essential for
students with serious difficulties they have added to the financial strain of
school districts. It is in this context that we see a major issue impacting
special education in America.
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1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006) (originally enacted in 1970).
2. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985).
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After Congress amended IDEA in 1997, some courts categorically
barred private school reimbursement for students who had not previously
enrolled in a public school special education program.3 These courts
interpreted IDEA to require that parents give public school districts an
opportunity to provide a FAPE before removing their child to private
school.4 With this bar, a paradox emerged: Students with disabilities could
only obtain a FAPE after attending a public school which denied them a
FAPE. As the Court in School Committee of Town of Burlington v.
Department of Education noted, the paradox placed parents in the
unenviable position of either choosing to keep their child in an
inappropriate placement in hopes of receiving an appropriate placement
later, or placing the child in an appropriate placement immediately without
the guarantee of reimbursement.
In Forest Grove School District v. TA., the United States Supreme
Court overruled these decisions, holding that parents of children with
disabilities could seek tuition reimbursement for private school placements
regardless of whether their child had previously received special education
from a public school.5
The Forest Grove decision was hailed as "very important. ''6  Kim
Sweet, Executive Director of Advocates for Children of New York, said the
ruling "preserve[d] the right to a free, appropriate public education for kids
with disabilities, whether or not their school district [was] able to offer
them an appropriate program.",7 A number of insurmountable hurdles,
however, may prevent parents from exercising this right.
Although Forest Grove was decided in favor of parents, inherent
structural factors continue to thwart IDEA's mandate to provide an
individualized free and appropriate education for all children. The paradox
remains. For the most part, children with special needs are still denied a
FAPE. Part II of this Note summarizes the pertinent provisions of IDEA,
including the statutory framework necessary to understand Forest Grove,
and examines the remedial right to tuition reimbursement under IDEA.
This section also discusses the inherent paradox that results from
interpreting IDEA as categorically barring tuition reimbursements to
parents who unilaterally remove their child. Part III surveys significant
circuit court cases preceding Forest Grove and describes the factual and
3. See e.g., Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 (1st Cir. 2004).
4. Id.
5. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). Court documents refer to
minors by their initials to protect the minors' identities.
6. Elizabeth Stull, Potential Impact of U.S. Supreme Court's 'Forest Grove' Ruling
Questioned by Rochester Attorneys, DAILY RECORDER (ROCHESTER, N.Y.), July 13, 2009,
available at http://nydailyrecord.com/blog/2009/07/13/potential-impact-of-8216forest-grove
8217-questioned-here/ (last visited April 1, 2010).
7. Id.
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judicial background of the Forest Grove case. Part IV examines the Forest
Grove decision itself and analyzes the Supreme Court's majority and
dissenting opinions. Part V discusses parents' practical inability to exercise
the right provided by Forest Grove and the narrow circumstances to which
this right applies. Finally, Part VI proposes that although Forest Grove has
minimal impact on the accessibility of special education, the decision itself
serves as a reminder of what all this fighting should be about - ensuring
all children have access to a free, appropriate public education.8
II. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. FRAMEWORK
Congress enacted IDEA "to ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them... a free appropriate public education which
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs... [and] to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities
and parents of such children are protected." 9 In order to receive federal
funding under IDEA, a state must meet the FAPE standard.' 0 School
districts must provide a written Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") to
children with disabilities." Developed with the collaboration of the child's
parents, school administrators, and other specialists, 12 the IEP must take
into consideration both the child's strengths and the parents' concerns.
13
IEPs must be reviewed annually to assess the level of success in the
implementation of the child's IEP and to make any necessary modifications
in order to meet the child's current needs.
14
While IDEA requires school districts to provide the services necessary
for the student to "benefit from the instruction," it does not require the
school to maximize the student's potential or provide the best possible
program.' 5 In Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme Court ruled that
states meet the FAPE requirements "by providing personalized education
8. See H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL III, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE LAW
AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 59-60 (1986) (explaining that following Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), "the exclusion of handicapped children from any opportunities
to learn ... is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause").
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1); and see Burlington, 471 U.S. at 367.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (2006).
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)-(2) (2006) (defining "individualized education program" and
setting forth its requirements). An IEP must include: (1) the child's levels of educational
performance; (2) "measurable" goals, including benchmarks or short-term objectives; (3)
the services and supplementary assistance to be provided; (4) the frequency, location, and
duration of services; and (5) the extent to which the child will be separated from non-
disabled children. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3) (2006).
14. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii) (2006).
15. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1981).
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with sufficient support services to permit the handicapped child to benefit
educationally from that instruction.' 6  Therefore, in order to meet the
FAPE standard, a public school is required only to offer a "basic floor of
opportunity" for the student: An education that is "reasonably calculated to
enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to
grade."'
17
B. PARENTAL RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT UNDER IDEA
The central issue in Forest Grove - tuition reimbursement for private
school - has long been controversial. Courts have granted a number of
remedies to enforce IDEA, including tuition reimbursement for the




IDEA empowers courts with broad discretion to "grant such relief as
the court determines is appropriate."' 9 In the 1985 case, School Committee
of Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, the Supreme Court
recognized retroactive reimbursement for private school as "appropriate
relief' authorized by IDEA.2 ° In Burlington, the parents of a disabled child
rejected the school district's proposed IEP, requested an administrative
hearing, and then unilaterally moved their child to a private placement they
believed would meet the child's educational needs. 21 At the hearing, it was
eventually determined that the school district's proposed IEP did not offer a
FAPE and that the parent's unilateral private placement was "the least
restrictive adequate program., 22 The school district argued that placement,
preceding any judicial ruling, violated the "stay-put" provision of IDEA,
which requires that a child stay in his or her current placement during the
pendency of any appeal.23
The Court rejected the school district's argument, holding that the
parents were entitled to tuition reimbursement because IDEA empowered
the trial court to "grant such relief as it determines is appropriate," and to
deny reimbursement after finding an IEP inappropriate would contradict
16. HendrickHudson, 458 U.S. at 189.
17. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 207.
18. MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 363 (2d ed. 2005).
19. 20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
20. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985).
21. Id. at 359.
22. Id. at 363.
23. See id. at 364. The "stay-put" provision of IDEA states: "During the pendency of
any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational
agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current
educational placement of such child." 20 U.S.C. § 14150) (2006).
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the right to a free education.24 The Court did not consider this remedy as
"damages," but as a repayment of "expenses that [the school district]
should have paid all along and would have been borne in the first instance
had it developed a proper IEP."' 5  If a court ultimately determines the
proposed IEP was appropriate, the parents are not entitled to
reimbursement. Thus, parents who unilaterally place their child into a
private placement act "at their own financial risk.,
26
Eight years later, in Florence County School District Four v. Carter,
the Supreme Court held that parents do not lose their right to tuition
reimbursement even if the private school selected does not meet all of
IDEA's requirements for public schools.2 7 This decision reached further
than Burlington, which involved reimbursement for a state-approved
private school.28 Carter affirmed that a parent may receive reimbursement
when the IEP proposed by the public school violates IDEA and the parents'
preferred placement is appropriate for the child.29  "[I]t hardly seems
consistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents from educating their child
at a school that provides an appropriate education simply because that
school lacks the stamp of approval of the same public school system that
failed to meet the child's needs in the first place." 30 As a result, private
school placements are only required to meet the broad "appropriate" relief
standard.
2. 1997 Revisions to IDEA
In 1997, Congress amended IDEA to explicitly address the remedy of
tuition reimbursement.31  Congress added to IDEA § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii),
entitled "Payment for education of children enrolled in private schools
without consent of or referral by the public agency," which states:
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received
special education and related services under the authority of a
public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or
secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public
agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to
reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or
hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free
24. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
25. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71.
26. Id. at 373-74.
27. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 (1993) (explaining tuition
reimbursements are not an unreasonable burden on school districts because the school has
the initial opportunity to offer an appropriate IEP within a public or private setting).
28. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 362.
29. Florence County, 510 U.S. at 12.
30. Id. at 14.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006).
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appropriate public education available to the child in a timely
manner prior to that enrollment.32
The ambiguity of the phrase, "who previously received special
education and related services" throws previous IDEA interpretations into
question. It is unclear whether the parental right to reimbursement
continues to exist where the child never previously received special
education services from the public agency. Here is the core of the problem,
an ambiguous phrase that opened the uncertainty wider, and lead to the
ruling in Forest Grove.
Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) codifies the decision in Burlington by stating
that a public agency is not required to "pay for the cost of education ... if
that agency made a free, appropriate public education available to the child
and the parents elected to place the child in such private school or
facility."33 However, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) requires that parents notify the
school district of their concerns about the IEP at the most recent IEP
meeting or ten days before removing their child to private school.34
Reimbursement can be reduced or denied if parents refuse to cooperate
with the school district or if the court finds the parents' actions were
unreasonable.
35
3. The Inherent Paradox of IDEA's Private Tuition Reimbursement
Provision
IDEA's 1997 revision brought greater confusion and controversy to the
process by which a child with disabilities might be unilaterally placed in
and reimbursed for private school. Much like the paradox confronting the
Court in Burlington - whether the stay-put provision could be consistently
read with IDEA's overarching goal of universalizing a FAPE for all
children - the issue in Forest Grove was how to read the new
§1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) consistently against IDEA's overarching educational
goal.
Reading §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a categorical bar to students with
disabilities contradicts the express purpose of IDEA and produces illogical
results. 36 Parents are placed in a lose-lose situation. To maintain the
options for reimbursement, parents are forced to enroll their child in an
inappropriate public placement in order to meet the "previously received"
requirement.37 Parents who choose instead to immediately move their child
into an appropriate placement are left with no effective remedy, even
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (2006).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2006).
35. Id.
36. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087.
37. Id.
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though the school district would have denied their child a FAPE.38
Conversely, school districts have an incentive to deny eligibility for special
education services in order to avoid their obligations to reimburse parents.
39
If a school district refused to identify a disabled child, the child would
never be eligible for special education from the school district, and
consequently, would never be entitled to tuition reimbursements for private
placements.4 °
Moreover, reading § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a categorical bar to tuition
reimbursement for children who previously received public special
education services conflicts with IDEA's child-find provision.41 The child-
find provision does not mention remedies, however, the interrelation
between the two provisions demonstrates Congressional intent to provide
them.42  By enacting the child-find provision, Congress placed an
affirmative obligation upon the states to identify all children with
disabilities in both public and private schools.43 It would be paradoxical
for Congress then to deny reimbursement to those private school students
that could not obtain a FAPE in public school due to the severity of their
disability. 4
Requiring public school enrollment as a prerequisite to tuition
reimbursement generates absurd results.45 For instance, if a child's
disabilities were identified before the child reached school age and the
public agency failed to provide a proper IEP, a parent would have no right
to reimbursement unless the child first followed the deficient IEP, to the
child's detriment.46 Under such circumstances, public school enrollment as
38. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087.
39. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17-19, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.
Ct. 2484 (2009) (No. 08-305). Justice Stevens suggested that under the school district's
approach, by adamantly denying that a student is eligible for special education services, a
school district might permanently avoid liability for reimbursing that student's tuition.
40. Id. at 17-19; see Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006). IDEA's child-find provision requires states to
identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing within their respective
state, regardless of the severity of the disability. Child-find duties are "affirmative," and a
parent is not required to request an evaluation of the child.
42. See Emily S. Rosenblum, Note, Interpreting the 1997 Amendment to IDEA: Did
Congress Intend to Limit the Remedy of Private School Tuition Reimbursement for Disabled
Children?, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2733, 2771-72 (2009).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2761.
46. Id. The law of contract recognizes that when A anticipatorily breaches, B is not
bound to perform. U.C.C. § 2-610 (Anticipatory Repudiation). The contract principle
should apply afortiori where B is a minor, who could avoid damage through placement in
private school.
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a prerequisite to tuition reimbursement can interrupt a child's education
and create psychologically damaging results.47
III. FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. TA.
A. CASE LAW LEADING TO FOREST GROVE
Whether § 1412(a)(10)(C) established a categorical bar to tuition
reimbursement for students who have not previously received special
education services under the authority of a public agency has been heavily
litigated. Before Forest Grove, despite litigation at all judicial levels, the
circuit courts remained divided, with the First Circuit interpreting a
categorical bar, and the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits allowing
parents to claim tuition reimbursements.48
Greenland School District v. Amy N. was the first circuit case to
address this issue.49 In Amy N., Katie, the child, never received, nor was
evaluated for, special education services while she attended public school.50
In August 2000, at the end of her fourth grade year, Katie's parents
unilaterally removed her from Greenland School District and enrolled her
into a private school.51 Katie enrolled in yet another private school in
March 2001.52 Greenland School District finally received the request for
evaluation or notification that Katie might require special education
services at this point, nearly seven months after Katie was unilaterally
removed.53 The First Circuit barred retroactive reimbursement, reasoning
that the statute's objective was to "give the school system an opportunity,
before the child is removed, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise
an appropriate program, and determine whether a free and appropriate
program can be provided in the public schools. 54 According to the court,
Congress intended to revoke private school tuition reimbursement for
students who had never received special education and related services
from a public agency.
55
47. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 25,
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009) (No. 08-305). "Appropriate
education during a child's formative years is critical to a child's development .... That is
true for any youth; it may be especially true for a child with a disability."
48. See Forest Grove, 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008); Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 376 (2d Cir. 2006); M.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 437
F.3d 1085, 1098 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 159-60
(1st Cir. 2004).
49. Greenland, 358 F.3d at 159.
50. Id. at 153.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 154.
54. Id. at 160.
55. Id. at 150.
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In 2006, however, the Second and Eleventh Circuits interpreted the
tuition reimbursement provisions broadly with no categorical bar to
students that had not previously attended public school.56 In MM. v.
School Board of Miami-Dade County Florida, the Eleventh Circuit held
that under §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), reimbursement cannot be denied solely
because the child did not previously receive special education services
from a public school. The court reasoned that requiring a parent to reserve
their reimbursement rights by accepting an inappropriate IEP conflicts with
the rights recognized in Burlington and its progeny.57
Six months later, the Second Circuit held in Frank G. v. Board of
Education, that because of IDEA's purpose, tuition reimbursements must
be implicitly allowed under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) even where the student had
never received special education services from a public school.58 Like the
Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit reasoned that Congress merely
intended to direct the 1997 Amendment at students who had previously
received special education and related services, leaving courts with the
option of applying principles of equity to those students who were not
explicitly included, as was the case before the 1997 amendments.59
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue in
another Second Circuit case, Tom F. v. Board of Education.60 The Court
affirmed the Second Circuit in a two-line opinion, holding that a parent
may receive reimbursement for a unilateral private placement even if the
student did not previously receive public school services. 61 The decision
was not precedential, however, because the Court split 4-4 after Justice
Kennedy recused himself.62 Only five days later, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the First Circuit case, Frank G. v. Board of Education
of Hyde Park, forgoing the opportunity to clarify § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
63
This left courts divided, with the First Circuit denying reimbursement, and
the Second, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits allowing reimbursement claims
56. See Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 359 (2d Cir. 2006) (granting tuition
reimbursements to parents of children who were unilaterally placed in private schools
having never received special education and related services from the public school district);
M.M. ex rel. CM. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County Fla., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 (1 lth Cir.
2006).
57. MM, 437 F.3d at 1099.
58. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 370.
59. Id.
60. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y. v. Tom F., 552 U.S. 1 (2007).
61. Id. (The two-line opinion read: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided
court. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision of this case.").
62. Id.
63. Mark Walsh, Justices Decline to Hear 2nd IDEA Case on Tuition, EDUC. WK. Oct.




for students who had not previously received special education services in
the public schools. The Supreme Court would resolve this issue in Forest
Grove.
B. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS OF FOREST GROVE
T.A. attended public school in the Forest Grove School District from
kindergarten until the spring semester of his junior year in high school.
64
T.A. struggled to advance through each grade, even with substantial help
from his parents and sister at home.65 Despite his inability to pay attention
in class and complete his schoolwork unaided, T.A. never received special
education services while enrolled in public school.66 At one point, his
guidance counselor suspected he might have a learning disability and
referred him for an evaluation for special education services.67 During
internal meetings, which excluded T.A.'s parents, school staff members
considered the possibility that T.A. had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder ("ADHD").68  The school's psychologists and educational
specialists formally evaluated T.A. and concluded that T.A. did not have a
learning disability, deeming him ineligible for special education services
under IDEA.69 Not knowing that school district staff had suspected that
T.A. had ADHD, his parents agreed that T.A. did not have a learning
disability.70
After this evaluation, T.A. began to use marijuana.71 Over the
following year, T.A.'s marijuana use became regular and his behavior
changed noticeably.72 His behavior worsened to the point that he ran away
from home, and police had to return him to his parents.73 That year, T.A.'s
parents took him to see a psychologist, and ultimately, to a hospital
emergency room. 74  The psychologist "diagnosed T.A. with ADHD,
depression, math disorder, and cannabis abuse. 75  The psychologist
recommended a three-week residential program for T.A. because of his
inability to reach his potential in school, his difficulties at home, his
attitude toward school, his drug abuse problem, and his overall sense of
64. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
65. Forest Grove, 523 F. 3d at 1081.
66. Id. at 1081-82.
67. Id. at 1081.
68. Id. The notes from a January 16, 2001 meeting state "Maybe ADD/ADHD?" and the
notes from a February 13, 2001 meeting mention "suspected ADHD." Id. ADHD is
classified as a mental disorder, which is distinct from a learning disability. Id. at 1081, n. 1.
69. Id. at 1081.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1082.
73. Id. at 1081-82.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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hopelessness. T.A.'s parents complied with the psychologist's
recommendation and after his discharge, placed T.A. in another residential
private program designed for children with academic and behavioral
difficulties.
Days after placing T.A. in private school, T.A.'s parents contacted a
lawyer who advised them to request a hearing under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) of
IDEA and seek an order requiring the school district to evaluate T.A. in all
areas of suspected disability.78 Although Forest Grove "acknowledged
T.A.'s learning difficulties, his diagnosis of ADHD, and his depression,"
the school district again concluded that T.A. did not qualify under IDEA
"because those diagnoses did not have a severe effect on T.A.'s educational
performance., 79 In the administrative hearing, the hearing officer rejected
Forest Grove's conclusions, instead finding that T.A.'s ADHD adversely
affected his educational performance and that Forest Grove did not fulfill
its obligations under IDEA by failing to identify T.A. as eligible for special
education services.
80
Since Forest Grove failed to offer T.A. a FAPE and his private school
placement was appropriate under IDEA, the hearing officer ordered Forest
Grove to reimburse T.A.'s parents for the private school tuition, which cost
$5,200 per month.81
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. District Court Decision
Forest Grove appealed the hearing officer's decision to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon, arguing that the reimbursement
was inappropriate because T.A. unilaterally withdrew from public school
without providing prior notice to the school district, he never received
special education and related services from the school district, and he
withdrew for reasons unrelated to the disability. Although the district court
agreed with the hearing officer's findings of facts, particularly that T.A.
was disabled and thus entitled to special education, the court nonetheless
held that T.A. was ineligible for reimbursement because he had not
"previously received special education and related services" from Forest
Grove, as required under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of IDEA. 2 Subsequently,





81. Forest Grove, 523 F. 3d at 1082-83 (explaining that the school district was not
responsible for the costs of the three-week rehabilitation program or the psychologist's
evaluation, but was responsible for the private school tuition because the school district
failed to provide T.A. with the minimum education IDEA mandated).
82. Id. at 1083.
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T.A. filed an appeal to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
83
2. The Ninth Circuit Decision
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's analysis in Frank G.,
reversed the district court, and held the statutory requirements of
§1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) did not apply to children who have not previously
received special education. The Ninth Circuit's decision also limited the
award of reimbursement to parents as a matter of equity pursuant to
§1415(i)(2)(C).84  The court reasoned that interpreting IDEA as
categorically barring reimbursement to students who had not previously
received public special education services contradicted the very purpose
behind IDEA - to guarantee all students with disabilities a FAPE
available to them.85 Moreover, it would lead to the illogical result that
parents had to wait until their child received inadequate special education
services from a public school before sending the child to an appropriate
private school.86 Where, as here, the school district failed to cooperate in
developing an effective IEP, the parents were left without any remedy.87
Despite the Ninth Circuit's alignment with the reasoning of the Second
and Eleventh Circuits, the First Circuit still remained in direct conflict with
the majority. 88 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 16, 2009,
to answer the question it had failed to resolve in Tom F. v. Board of
Education: "Whether § 1412(a)(10(C) establishes a categorical bar to
tuition reimbursement for students who have not previously received
special-education services under the authority of a public agency."89 The
Court delivered its 6-3 decision on June 22, 2009.90 The Court held in
favor of T.A.'s parents, stating that the "IDEA authorizes reimbursement
for the cost of private special-education services when a school district fails
to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate,
83. Forest Grove, 523 F. 3d at 1078. The Ninth Circuit initially deferred the case
pending the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Tom F. However, the
Supreme Court did not reach a majority decision in that case, and so did not establish
precedent.
84. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087-88.
85. Id. at 1087.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Forest Grove, 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008); Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 376 (2d Cir. 2006); M.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 437
F.3d 1085, 1098 (11th Cir. 2006); Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 159-60
(1st Cir. 2004).
89. Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2490 (2009).
90. See id. at 2484.
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regardless of whether the child previously received special education or
related services through the public school.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FOREST GROVE DECISION
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer and
Justice Alito.92 Justice Souter dissented in judgment, joined by Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas.93
A. JUSTICE STEVENS' MAJORITY DECISION
The Court relied on its previous holdings in Burlington and Carter.
94
Although Burlington and Carter addressed a district's failure to offer an
IEP, rather than the appropriateness of a proposed IEP, the Court
considered the factual differences insignificant. 95 The Court's analysis in
Burlington and Carter regarding the language and purpose of IDEA
applied to Forest Grove.96 The only new question was whether the 1997
Amendments, specifically the notice requirement in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii),
required a different result.97
The Court concluded that the 1997 Amendments to IDEA did not
impliedly repeal the Burlington and Carter decisions because Congress
presumably adopts judicial interpretations when it reenacts a statute
without change.98 Rejecting the district's argument, the Court held the
1997 Amendments did not prohibit reimbursement in Forest Grove. In
reaching that conclusion, the Court found that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)
explicitly barred reimbursement only when the public school provided the
child with a FAPE.99 The provision made no reference to the availability of
tuition reimbursement when the school district failed to meet the FAPE
requirement.100 Therefore, it would follow that where a school district
failed to provide the child with a FAPE, tuition reimbursement would be an
available remedy. 1°1
91. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2496.
92. Id. at 2484.
93. Id.
94. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2490-91.
95. Id. at 2491. The Court reasoned, "when a child requires special education services, a
school district's failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious a violation of its
responsibilities under IDEA as a failure to provide an adequate IEP."
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2494 ("Absent a clearly expressed congressional intention, repeals by
implication are not favored." (quoting Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003))).
99. Id. at 2493.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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Although § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) requires reimbursement only for
children who previously received special education services, the Court
pointed to the provision's permissive phrasing, which only specified courts
"may require" reimbursement in certain circumstances and did not
foreclose reimbursement awards in other situations. 10 2 The opinion advised
the "clauses of § 1412(a)(10)(C) are thus best read as elucidative rather
than exhaustive."'
0 3
The Court further concluded denying reimbursement in Forest Grove
would be at odds with the general remedial purpose of IDEA and the 1997
Amendments because it contradicted IDEA's child-find requirements.
10 4
Pursuant to those requirements, states are obligated to "identifly], locat[e],
and evaluat[e] ... [a]ll children with disabilities residing in the state" to
ensure that they receive needed special-education services."0 5 In the
Court's view, "immunizing a school district's refusal to find a child eligible
for special-education services no matter how compelling the child's
need.., would produce a rule bordering on the irrational."' 0 6 Indeed, it
would be peculiar of IDEA to afford parents a remedy when a school
district failed to provide an appropriate education, but deny that remedy in
the more egregious circumstance of the school district failing to provide an
IEP altogether.1
0 7
Finally, the majority rejected the district's argument that under the
Spending Clause, any conditions attached to a State's acceptance of funds
must be unambiguous.' 0 8 The Court explained that by virtue of accepting
IDEA funds, states expressly agree to provide a FAPE to all students with
disabilities.'0 9 Citing Burlington, the Court noted a reimbursement award
merely required a school district "to belatedly pay expenses that it should
have paid all along."'" 0 Moreover, states have been on notice since the
Burlington decision that IDEA authorizes courts to order reimbursement in
"appropriate" circumstances."' The majority also dismissed the district's
argument that allowing reimbursement, in cases such as Forest Grove,
102. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2493. ("[Cilause (ii) is best read as elaborating on the
general rule that courts may order reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a
FAPE by listing factors that may affect a reimbursement award in the common situation in
which a school district has provided a child with some special-education services and the
child's parents believe those services are inadequate.").
103. Id.
104. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
105. Id. at 2495 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2495.
108. Id.
109. Id.




would result in less cooperation and more financial burden.' 1 2 Although
parents "are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes
both the public placement violated IDEA and the private school placement
was proper under the Act,"'" 3 and courts retain discretion to reduce a
reimbursement award if warranted by the equities, the "incidence of
private-school placement at public expense is quite small."
' 14
B. DISSENT
Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas." 5 Justice Souter agreed with the majority that IDEA's provisions
were indeed ambiguous in their silence concerning circumstances where no
previous special education services or FAPE was available." 16 However,
"when permissive language covers a special case, the natural sense of it is
taken to prohibit what it fails to authorize. ' 17 Justice Souter stated that §
1412(a)(10)(C)(i) may be read to imply that school districts can be
expected to fulfill their obligations and to assert the general rule that
unilateral placement cannot be reimbursed."' Meanwhile §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) imposes a "receipt of prior services limit on any
exceptions to that general rule when school officials fall short of providing
a FAPE."" 9  Accordingly, reimbursement for students who had not
received such services was prohibited under the 1997 Amendments.
C. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
The Supreme Court remanded Forest Grove to the U.S. District Court
in Portland, Oregon. 20  The district court found T.A. ineligible for
reimbursement.12 ' The court pointed out that the parents unilaterally placed
T.A. in Mount Bachelor Academy due to his drug and behavioral problems,
which are not considered disabilities under IDEA. 2 2 In listing the reasons
for enrolling T.A. at Mount Bachelor Academy, T.A.'s father failed to
mention symptoms which brought T.A. under the purview of IDEA, such
112. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2495.
113. Id. (citing Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2497.
116. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2499.
117. Id. at 2500.
118. Id. at 2499-500.
119. Id. at 2500.
120. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. CV 04-331-MO, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115356, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 8, 2009).
121. Id. at, at *3.
122. Id. at *8-9 ("The decisive factor in this case is that T.A.'s parents appear to have
enrolled T.A. in [Mount Bachelor Academy] not because of any disability recognized by the
[IDEA] but because of his drug abuse and behavior problems.").
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as ADHD or "trouble with school work."'' 23 As a result, Forest Grove was
not liable for T.A's tuition.
124
V. AN ILLUSORY WIN FOR PARENTS
Forest Grove is viewed as a victory for parents of children with
disabilities who may now seek reimbursement for private school tuition,
even if their child never attended a public school. The decision, however,
provides no actual assurance to parents in this atypical situation and only
removes the absolute bar to tuition reimbursement, indicating that the
actual implications of the decision may be less significant than they appear.
A. IMPACTS ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TUITION REIMBURSEMENT
CASES
Although Forest Grove serves to expand IDEA's coverage to situations
where students have not been enrolled in, or classified by, a public school,
the decision's actual impact is limited by the significant number of
requirements parents must meet under IDEA. Only in rare cases do parents
seek reimbursement for private school tuition before first enrolling the
child into a public school. 125  In 2006, only 0.97% of children with
disabilities were placed in private placements at the public expense, and in
2007 the percentage increased slightly to 1.13%.126 Of these private
placements, the overwhelming majority account for "agreed placements,"
which are placements that both the school district and the parents agree are
necessary to ensure the child in question receives an appropriate education
under IDEA. 127  This also substantiates the argument that parents who
123. Id. at *9-10. On the application, T.A.'s father indicated that, "enrollment was
precipitated by 'inappropriate behavior, depression, opposition, drug use, runaway."'
(citation omitted).
124. Id. at *11.
125. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Data Tables for State Office of Special Education Programs
("OSEP") Data, IDEA Part B Educational Environment, Tbl. 2-2 (Fall 2006),
http://www.ideadata.org/tables30th/ar_2-2.htm [hereinafter "U.S. Dep't of Educ. (2006)"];
U.S. Dep't of Educ., Data Tables for State Office of Special Education Programs ("OSEP"')
Data, IDEA Part B Educational Environment, Tbl. 2-2 (Fall 2007),
http://www.ideadata.org/TABLES31ST/AR_2-2.htm (In 2007, 67,729 children out of
5,978,081 children were placed in a private setting at public expense. In 2006, it was
57,078 children out of 5,888,227 children. The 2006 and 2007 data is the most current data
available. Coincidentally, these percentages were quite similar in 1997, when Congress
amended IDEA in such a way that the dissent in Forest Grove believed would limit burden
of private placements.) [hereinafter "U.S. Dep't of Educ. (2007)"].
126. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (2006), supra note 125; U.S. Dep't of Educ. (2007), supra note
125.
127. Brief for Nat'l Sch. Boards Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct 2484 (2009)(No. 08-305); see also 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(B) (2006) (discussing children with disabilities who are placed in or referred to
private schools by the public agency as the means of carrying out the requirements of
IDEA).
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typically request tuition reimbursement do so based on a sincere belief that
the IEP provided by the public school does not meet the requirements of a
FAPE.
128
Generally, school districts only agree to transfer a student to a private
placement as a last resort. Because schools receive federal funding to
provide a FAPE to children with disabilities, they have an interest in
retaining the special education population. For every child removed to a
private placement, the money allocated for that child's education follows
him to the new school. Considering this financial incentive, schools will
only agree to private placement in cases of clear necessity, meaning only
children with severe disabilities. Because it is rare for a child with
disabilities to be placed in private school under IDEA, only under
exceptional circumstances do parents ever receive tuition reimbursements
without the agreement of the public schools. As such, the applicability of
Forest Grove reaches such a narrow category of cases that it is hardly a
significant victory for the special education community.
Forest Grove School District's attorney, Andrea Hungerford, argued
that the Forest Grove decision broadened the scope of a FAPE, claiming
that "[n]ow it's not only the parents of special education students who can
seek private reimbursement, but it's also the parents of regular education
students who can say, 'you should have identified my child under IDEA,
but you did not, and now I want consideration.' ' 129  Hungerford
exaggerated the breadth of the decision, because the "notice and
cooperation" requirement of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) weeds out those
claimants who Hungerford fears will bring frivolous lawsuits against the
school district. Further, claims brought on behalf of regular education
students would only survive upon a showing of special needs. Only those
parents who diligently pursued special education services from the public
school, but were denied, have a chance at overcoming the hurdle of §
1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). To determine whether the right to reimbursement
exists, courts "must consider all relevant factors, including the notice
provided by the parents and the school district's opportunities for
evaluating the child."'130 As was the case prior to Forest Grove, courts
retain the option to reduce or deny the cost of reimbursement based on the
above factors. This does not open the floodgates of litigation for parents of
128. Id.
129. Nancy Townsley, U.S. Supreme Court Interprets Law to Say that Parents of Special
Needs Students can Seek Tuition Reimbursement for Private Schooling, FOREST GROVE
NEWS-TIMES, June 23, 2009, available at http://www.forestgrovenewstimes.com/
news/printstory.php?story-id= 124582710640480800 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
130. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009).
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general education students to sue if they never exercised reasonable efforts
to attain special education services from the public school to begin with.'
3'
Forest Grove impliedly affects only those students in the most
egregious circumstance - students denied services due to a failure of the
school's child-find responsibilities. 32 Under IDEA, if a child's behavior
raises a red flag, the school district has an affirmative duty to evaluate her,
and provide appropriate services if she is eligible. After Forest Grove, a
school violates the FAPE requirement if it misevaluates a child and finds
her ineligible, or breaches its duty to evaluate the child altogether. The
child's parent, after paying for private school services, may bring a suit for
reimbursement, even though special education services were not previously
received.
B. PARENTAL DISADVANTAGES: DIFFICULTY IN PREVAILING
After Forest Grove, parents may obtain private school tuition
reimbursement even though their child never received special education
services from the public school. To receive tuition reimbursement, parents
must make two separate showings: The school district failed to provide a
free appropriate public education, and the private placement was
appropriate. 133 These showings, however, may prove difficult for parents.
Parents are often overwhelmed, not only by the complexities of dealing
with a child with disabilities, particularly those who would need private
placement in the first place, but also by partaking in a process for which
they have no training, often have little time, and rarely have the resources
to appropriately tackle the process.
1. Parents' Burden of Proof
It is painstaking for parents to exercise their legal rights, despite the
apparent protections. The due process system is practically undecipherable
without legal assistance, and the likelihood of prevailing is remote without
expert witness testimony.' 34 The burden of proof is even heavier as a result
of Arlington Central School District v. Murphy, which denies
131. In fact, the burden of proof on parents in reimbursement cases is so high as to
unjustly prevent parties with potentially valid claims from prevailing on the merits. See
infra Section III.B.
132. Pursuant to IDEA's child-find requirement, states are obligated to "identifqy],
locat[e], and evaluat[e]" "[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the state" to ensure that
they receive needed special education services. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2495 (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006)).
133. See Shaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (holding that the party seeking relief in an
administrative proceeding carries the burden of proof and persuasion, unless there is
guidance on the issue from IDEA/97).
134. Kelly D. Thomason, Note, The Costs of a "Free'" Education: The Impact of Schaffer
v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy on Litigation Under IDEA, 57 DUKE L.J. 457, 472-473
(2007).
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reimbursement of expert witness fees to prevailing parents in IDEA
litigation. 135 Without expert witness reimbursement, few parents can afford
the very witnesses that are an integral part of the hearing. Requiring
parents to shoulder the costs of hiring experts to rebut the presumption of a
proper IEP effectively denies the parents a "free" appropriate public
education for their child.
136
The impacts of these burdens on the household of the special education
students are even more troubling. 137 Despite similar employment patterns,
parents of children with disabilities tend to earn less in comparison to
parents of non-special needs children.138 Of the seven million children
across the country that receive special education services under IDEA,
approximately thirty-six percent live in residences with an income of
$25,000 or less, and thirty-two percent live in residences with an income of
between $25,000 and $50,000.19 The majority of these households do not
have resources to hire expert witnesses, leaving parents with little
opportunity to prove that the district violated the FAPE requirement. This
effectively strips them of their right to a hearing under IDEA. Even if
parents could raise the money for litigation, they will not be reimbursed for
these substantial costs should they eventually prevail. 140  The same
problems arise when parents face the costs of private school special
education services. Many parents are not able to afford the high cost of
private education, even if they anticipate reimbursement resulting from
successful litigation.
141
In contrast, school districts have a clear advantage. 142 They only need
to show that the student's IEP was "reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits.', 143 Large school districts typically
have the resources necessary to hire specialized lawyers, special educators,
135. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 294 (2006);
Thomason, supra note 134, at 483.
136. Thomason, supra note 134, at 486. ("When parents must pay for their own experts
in order to satisfy the burden of proof in a hearing to guarantee their child's free and
appropriate education, that education is no longer free, but rather carries very high costs.").
137. Id. at483.
138. Id.; MARY WAGNER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 24, 28 (2002), http://www.seels.net/designdocs/
SEELSChildrenWeServe Report.pdf.
139. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Parents as Quasi-Therapists Under the Individuals With
Disabilities Education Act, 76 U. CON. L. REV. 899, 913 (2008) (citing WAGNER, supra note
138).
140. Rubinstein, supra note 139, at 913.
141. Id.
142. Jay P. Greene, A Special Plan for Palin, NAT'L REV., Sept. 9, 2008,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MzF1N2ZmNzMxYWY3MGE5NmlyZTU2OWEyYW
ViZDhlNjc=&w=MA= (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
143. Hendrick Hudson, 458 U.S. at 207.
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psychologists and other expert witnesses that can testify on their behalf'
44
In fact, one study found parents were substantially unlikely to win against
school districts, losing about seventy percent of the time. 145 A 2002 report
from the President's Commission on Excellence in Special Education
stated that "[t]he current system often places process above results, and
bureaucratic compliance above student achievement, excellence and
outcomes. The system is driven by complex regulations, excessive
paperwork and ever-increasing administrative demands at all levels... 146
Although parents have legal rights, litigation is expensive, time-consuming,
and emotionally draining - all before facing the insurmountable burden
necessary to prevail on the merits. One commentator goes so far as to
compare the difficult task parents face in challenging school boards to "that
of jailhouse lawyers, who are inmates themselves, seeking to represent
fellow prisoners in court litigation.' ' 147  Even when parents feel that the
public education system has done a disservice to their child, there is not
much they can do despite all the seemingly protective legal regulations in
place.
2. Lack of Guidance
Even if parents are fortunate enough to meet the burden of showing the
school failed to provide a FAPE, they must still show that the private
education program of their choice is "appropriate." The absence of a clear
definition of "appropriateness" often cuts in favor of the school district,
creating a challenge similar to that of proving a FAPE violation.
The current Rowley standard is far too subjective and equivocal to be
applied effectively.148  The absence of a substantive definition for an
"appropriate" education has caused considerable litigation between parents
and school districts, and poses a significant hurdle for parents. Without the
144. Thomason, supra note 134, at 472.
145. Learning Disabilities Association of Illinois, Due Process Hearings,
http://www.ldail.org/hearing.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
146. Rubinstein, supra note 139, at 904 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN
SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUC. FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES 7 (2002), available at http://www.ed.gov/inits/commissionsboards/whspecial
education/reports/imagesiPresRep.pdf.
147. Id.
148. In Bd. of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982) the Court set forth a two-part test: "First, has the state complied with the procedures
set forth in the Act? And second, is the Individualized Education Program developed
through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits?" 458 U.S. at 206-07. The second prong of the test has proven
difficult for courts in ascertaining how much benefit is necessary to meet the standard. See,
e.g., Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 180 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(holding that educational benefit must be "more than trivial"); Deal v. Hamilton County Bd.
of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating benefit must be "more than de
minimis").
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ability to gauge appropriateness, parents engaging in a cost/benefit analysis
face an incalculable probability of success, and must blindly bear the risk
of litigation. David Harris, a special education attorney, pointed out, "[i]t
was a bad case for the court to take [because] it did not give much general
guidance in situations where parents are unhappy with what a school
district offers in terms of special education."'' 49  In light of the limited
impact of Forest Grove on the special education community, it is
increasingly important to ensure all students with disabilities are indeed
receiving a FAPE.
VI. MOVING BEYOND FOREST GROVE
Although the immediate impact of Forest Grove is modest, it may
serve special education interests in the long term by changing the way
schools and parents think about these services. The holding in Forest
Grove opens the door for diligent parents to hold schools accountable when
they fail to identify a student's special needs and provide a FAPE. It also
forces parents to do their due diligence when advocating for their children
by reiterating the notice and cooperation requirements of IDEA. Increased
accountability among schools and parents may in fact reduce litigation
costs by placing money where it belonged in the first place - on special
educational services.
Forest Grove cautions school districts to conduct thorough evaluations
that take into account both apparent and hidden disorders when
determining eligibility under IDEA.150 Not only will school districts need
to actively identify and serve children with special education needs, but
they will also put more consideration into the type of services that are
appropriate for the child.1 51 Students who have fallen through the cracks
and been denied necessary services now have a voice to demand that
education. For example, on remand, the district court found that the
evaluation for T.A. was not sufficient because he was not evaluated in all
areas of suspected need as required by law. 52 As a result, schools will be
149. Stull, supra note 6.
150. Charles P. Conroy, The Tragedy and Triumph of T.A., BOSTON GLOBE, June 25,
2009, at A15, available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorialopinion/
oped/articles/2009/06/25/the-tragedy-andtriumph.of ta/ ("The true winners were children
with what one might call hidden disabilities - social, emotional, and learning needs that are
often less apparent than some visual, auditory, ambulatory, or intellectual challenges.").
151. See Kari Miller, Expert Perspective; Thoughts on Forest Grove School District vs.
T.A., examiner.com, June 27, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-10067-LA-Special-
Education-Examiner-y2009m6d27-Expert-perspective-thoughts-on-Forest-Grove-School-
District-vs-TA (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
152. Specifically, no evaluation was ordered for "other health impairments" although
notations made during a previous evaluation regarded the possibility that T.A. suffered from
ADHD.
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more aware of students who may fall into this category and will work
rigorously to determine an appropriate IEP.
Similarly, if schools do not offer an appropriate IEP in a timely
manner, parents are no longer forced to keep their child in the inappropriate
placement in order to preserve their reimbursement claim. As a result, it
will be in the school districts' best interest to be more responsive to
parental concerns and ensure that any necessary services are administered
as soon as possible.
One of the most common aversions to Forest Grove stems from a fear
that the number of parents requesting reimbursement for expensive private
placements will skyrocket. As Forest Grove clarifies, in a hearing for
reimbursement, judges must consider the level of cooperation between the
school and parents when awarding damages. As a result, only meritorious
claims will result in damage awards. This gives parents an incentive to
cooperate with school districts to attain appropriate services before
unilaterally placing their child into a private placement.
School districts are rightfully concerned about finances. However,
school districts may not improperly allow budget concerns to trump their
statutory obligations to provide a FAPE to every child in the district.
Justice O'Connor described the thriftiest solution available to school
districts: "[P]ublic educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing
parents for the private education of a disabled child can do one of two
things: Give the child a free[,] appropriate public education in a public
setting, or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's
choice."1
53
The time and money spent litigating education would be better spent on
providing adequate services to the students who need them. Parents who
bring claims typically do so because they believe there is no other
alternative to obtaining an appropriate education for their child. 154 As the
Supreme Court noted, the legal system is an ineffective remedy for the
denial of a child's FAPE. Parents are not eager to run to the courthouse, so
measures that establish a greater rapport between parents and schools
would reduce the number of parents who are forced to resort to litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court's decision in Forest Grove is arguably a
victory for parents of children with disabilities, its direct impact on the
special education community is narrower than first thought. The decision
153. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
154. See Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2011
(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating cases seeking reimbursement are unlikely to be
frivolous because it is unreasonable for parents to pay for litigation over a tuition
reimbursement without a substantial belief that the IEP offered is inappropriate).
[Vol. 21:2
LOST IN FOREST GROVE
affects only a small percentage of tuition reimbursement cases because it is
unusual for a parent to seek reimbursement for a private placement before
their child attends public school. Essentially, its force is limited to one
particular circumstance: Students who have not previously received special
education services due to a failure of the public school's child-find
responsibilities. Moreover, Forest Grove's ultimate disposition on remand
illustrates the substantial obstacles these parents still face: They must meet
a high evidentiary burden under Schaffer, they must front their own high
(but often necessary) expert witness costs under Arlington, and finally they
face the lack of judicial guidance on what constitutes an "appropriate"
education. 155
Making certain IDEA is unambiguous and avoids inequitable results is
of great import to the future of our nation. Young children, who receive
appropriate services from a young age, require fewer special education
services later in their education, are not held back as often, and maintain
higher test scores in comparison to children who do not receive the
appropriate services and accommodations. 156 "If the city and other school
districts put as much energy into improving their special education
offerings as it does using special education as a scapegoat, fewer students
would need private placement in the first place." '157 Thus, when children
receive appropriate services, as IDEA intended, they have more potential to
serve as productive members of our society and need less support and
services from the government as adults. Courts must properly interpret
IDEA's provisions within the spirit of its intentions to ensure children
receive the services necessary for them to lead meaningful and fulfilling
lives.
155. See Shaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005); see Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 294 (2006).
156. F.A. Campbell et. al., Early Childhood Education: Young Adult Outcomes from the
Abecedarian Project, in 6 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL Sci. 2, 43-44, 52 (2002).
157. Jay Greene & Marcus Winters, No More Excuses: Freston as Scapegoat, N.Y. SUN,
Nov. 8, 2007, available at http://www.nysun.com/opinion/freston-as-scapegoat/66084/.
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